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Corrupted Courts: A Cross-National Perceptual Analysis of Judicial Corruption
Dramatic variation exists across countries in whether citizens perceive the presence of corruption
in the very institution entrusted with upholding the law, the national judiciary. Identifying, explaining,
and interpreting such variation are the goals of this study. Judicial corruption is an increasingly salient,
yet vastly under-researched, topic in the fields of comparative and judicial politics. While much of the
research literature is devoted to single country studies and inductive narratives, largely missing is
systematic, theory-driven, cross-national empirical investigation. Drawing upon data from such sources
as Transparency International, the World Bank, and Freedom House, this thesis adds to the understanding
of perceived judicial corruption. A statistical analysis, though limited by existing data, demonstrates that
aspects of accountability (the ability to remove judges) and transparency (freedom of the press) are only
weakly related to perceptions of judicial corruption. A systematic country comparison shows that the
structure of the judicial system explains variations in perceived judicial corruption.
What factors influence perceived judicial corruption? Money and effort are being expended to
reform judiciaries to ensure that they are independent, fair, and free from corruption. Yet comparatively
little consideration is given to ensuring that the citizens, those who should turn to the judiciary for
protection, perceive the judiciary to be more trustworthy. For example, in October 2004 the World Bank
authorized an additional $1.2 million for judicial reform in Peru. According to Transparency
International’s Corruption Perception Barometer the people of Peru want corruption eliminated from the
judicial system more than any other institution. According to the 1995 World Values Survey 80% of the
Peruvian respondents have little or no confidence in the legal system. Given that this is the second effort
to reform Peru’s judiciary (the World Bank cancelled the first $22 million loan during the Fujimori
regime), will the $1.2 million dollars improve these perceptions? While some proponents argue that
making changes to increase transparency will decrease corruption, efforts at judicial reform in Latin
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America contradicts this argument. Conversely, over 55% of Nigerians have confidence in their reformed
legal system. 1 Yet in October 2004 Nigerian judges, including Supreme Court judges, were arrested on
charges of corruption including accepting $39M in bribes. 2
Corruption undermines democracy, reduces the potential for economic growth, and threatens the
freedom and security of citizens. Perceived corruption can be even more devastating because correction
requires both marketing a non-corrupt image and rebuilding the legitimacy of, and confidence in, the
system. Corruption in the judiciary, real or perceived, has political and economic impacts since
individuals, businesses, political parties, and interest groups all look to the courts for protection from and
redress against crimes, including corruption. In this situation, the outlook for correcting corruption in
other areas of the state becomes bleak since the judiciary is one arm of defense against corruption.
Conversely, if businesses and individuals perceive courts to be relatively free from corruption, the courts
can legitimize and enforce the rule of law to minimize corruption in the state. Because of the reliance on
the courts to minimize corruption, it might be reasonably expected that countries with lower perceived
overall corruption would also have lower perceived judicial corruption. Also, since the judiciary is a
branch of the government, it could be expected that a citizenry that perceives high levels of judicial
corruption would also perceive high levels of overall corruption. But is this really the case? The
reasonable expectation is actually a surprisingly untested empirical proposition that demands scrutiny by
comparitivists and country experts. The relationship between perceptions of corruption in the judiciary
and in the political system prompts a litany of timely, but largely unresearched, questions. Are there
differences in the structure of the judicial system that impact the perception of judicial corruption? Why
would citizens in a country with high overall corruption be less concerned about judicial corruption than
citizens in a country with low overall corruption? Why do two countries with equal overall corruption
have variances in levels of concern over corruption in the judiciary and confidence in the legal system?
Although much has been written about the relationship between the perception of fair judicial process and
legal legitimacy (Tyler et al, 1991, 1989; Tyler, 2000, 1994) as well as the causes and impacts of
corruption (Thurow, 2003; Heymens and Lipiez, 1999; Eigen, 1996), and while a limited number of
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studies have measured perceived judicial corruption (Eigen, 2002; Carothers, 1999; Mauruo, 1995),
scholars have not effectively addressed the factors impacting perceived judicial corruption. By
understanding the causes of perceived judicial corruption insight will be gained into ways that perceptions
can be informative (if they truly reflect a corrupt situation) or corrected (if the judiciary is being wrongly
accused). Since fighting corruption has gained a global focus through the efforts of the United Nations,
the World Bank, and Transparency International, this understanding will contribute to the analysis of their
efforts and contributions.
This thesis seeks to explain the variations in perceived judicial corruption through both a
quantitative and case study test of hypotheses. Building on prior research it will argue that citizen
interactions with the judicial system matter. Through statistical models and in-depth analysis of specific
cases this thesis will demonstrate that transparency and accountability, the standard answers to corruption,
do not sufficiently explain perceptions of judicial corruption. The type of legal system and courts has
more of an impact on perceptions of judicial corruption.
The thesis proceeds in five sections. The first section specifies the dependent variable by
establishing the definition, causes, and impacts of overall corruption in the state and then specifically in
the judiciary. Since corruption has been shown to undermine legitimacy (Eigen, 1996), this section also
compares the rival factors advanced by scholars seeking to explain variations in perceptions of judicial
legitimacy based on a review of the extant literature. The second section derives testable hypotheses for
measuring the relationship between overall corruption and judicial corruption. An explanatory model is
tested and the results presented in the third section. A comparative case test of the hypotheses is
performed in the fourth section. The fifth section explores the impacts of the results, relates the analysis
to broader literature and its concerns, and concludes by mapping out future research opportunities.
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Corruption: Conceptual Foundations and Magnitude of Variation
Corruption, like many other terms, is a generally recognized word, and, therefore, has many
definitions. Beginning with a broad definition, Scott views corruption as a departure from behavioral
standards (Scott, 1972). Although he further refines the definition to include an indication of whom and
why, his definition focuses on deviant behavior. Eigen uses a slightly more explicit definition by viewing
corruption as the use of power for personal gain (Eigen, 2002). Stapenhurst and Sedigh extend this
definition slightly to include both personal and group gain (Stapenhurst and Kpundeh, 1999). While these
are all helpful definitions, they are still too broad to provide a working concept that lends itself to
operationalization. Since this thesis focuses on judicial corruption the above definitions can be combined
and slightly modified resulting in a focused definition: the abuse, by a public official, of entrusted power
for personal benefit.
Yet even within this definition there is some ambiguity since public officials can either be
elected, appointed, or hired (as in administrative) and the corruption can occur at any point along the
continuum from the establishment to the enforcement of laws. Pradhan et al (2000) in their report
prepared for the World Bank help to clarify this with their disctinction between “state” and
“administrative” corruption. By their definition state corruption occurs in the formation of laws whereas
administrative corruption occurs in the implementation of the laws. Since the judiciary deals with the
application of laws, judicial corruption would occur in the administrative realm. Therefore, our definition
can be further refined to: the abuse of power, for personal benefit, by a public official entrusted to
administer the application of laws in a fair and judicious manner. Because “public official” can still be
misleading we can then define this term as a person elected or appointed to the judiciary and the
supporting administrative staff.
As a final point of clarification, for the purposes of this thesis the judiciary does not include
police or any other of the law enforcement arms of the state. There are two reasons for this. First, it
ensures that the focus remains on the judicial system. Related fields such as law enforcement have
corruption issues that are significant in their own right and would mitigate the attention to the judiciary.
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Second, empirical measures and surveys make this distinction. For example, both the World Values
Survey and Transparency International’s Corruption Barometer provide separate measures for the
judiciary and the police. Consistency with these studies strengthens the reliability and validity of the
measures used.
With this definition the question can then be asked why it would be important theoretically,
substantively, and methodologically to study corruption in judiciary. The first step to answering this
question involves an understanding of the political impacts of corruption in general. First, corruption,
both actual and perceived, undermines the legitimacy of the state (Eigen, 2002). When the citizens of a
state see that corruption has invaded the government they lose faith that the government is capable of
working for their interests (Eigen, 2002). When this happens the citizens have at least three choices.
First, they could force the resignation of the corrupt officials. President Estrada of the Philippines
discovered this in 2002 when protesters demanded his resignation when the legislature failed to act on
evidence of his corruption (Eigen, 2002). Second, they could find alternate avenues to gain the access
needed to government such as creating an underground economy (Pradhan et al, 2000). Evidence of this
is seen in Latin America where countries (such as Mexico and Colombia) with corrupt, inefficient, and
overworked legal systems have seen increases in private enforcement measures (Mainwaring and Welna,
2003). Third, they could accept the costs associated with a corrupt judiciary. For example, citizens in
Guatemala are discouraged from using the legal system because of the ease with which criminals are able
to benefit from the corruption (Mainwaring and Welna, 2003). If the chosen avenue becomes too much
of a threat to the government it will become politically unstable. Officials will increase their focus on
maintaining power and corruption will become self-sustaining (Damania, Fredriksson, Mani, 2003). One
example of this situation is Cameroon where the President, who succeeded in having the constitution
modified to both extend his term of office and allow him to run for a fourth term, has appointed all
members of the judiciary thus minimizing his risk of legal challenges.3 In Argentia, Chavez followed this
pattern of constitutional change to remain in power coupled with control of the judiciary through
appointments (Finkel, 2004).
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Second, corruption hinders economic development both internally and externally (Eigen, 2002;
Heymens and Lipiez, 1999; Thurow 2003). Internally, corruption prevents competition and causes the
government to operate inefficiently (Heymens and Lipiez, 1999). Externally, corruption inhibits foreign
direct investment both by diverting aid into corrupt hands and increasing the costs of doing business in
the country (Thurow, 2003). Since poverty breeds corruption and corruption deters wealth the result is a
circle from which it is hard to escape. The more widespread corruption becomes, moreover, the more
resistant it becomes to change (Damania, Fredriksson, Mania, 2003).
Finally, corruption undermines democracy (Eigen, 2002). Corruption circumvents the workings
of democracy in three ways. First, many acts of corruption undermine human rights (Eigen, 2002) by
fostering discrimination. Corruption also undermines political and civil rights, such as free speech and
fair elections, which are important to the development and perpetuation of a democracy (Eigen, 2002;
Dahl, 1971). Third, studies have demonstrated that democracy is more likely to be successful in a
wealthy country (Dahl, 1971; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi 2000), that corruption hinders
economic development (Eigen, 2002; Heymens and Lipiez, 1999; Thurow 2003), and that corruption is
more likely to occur in underdeveloped countries (Eigen, 1996). It therefore follows that corruption will
make it harder for a country to sustain democracy.
Thus it can be seen that incidences of corruption can have a significant political impact on the
overall stability of the state. Peru’s Fujimori felt these impacts when evidence illustrated that his
administrative officials bribed the media to support him. Corruption in the judiciary is the most
devastating form for a state because it either supports the rule of law, thereby thwarting corruption and
fostering freedom, or it undermines the rule of law resulting in an implicit, if not explicit, support of
corruption. Both of these examples can be seen in Argentina. Under Alfonsin the Argentine judiciary
had enough independence to issue opinions against the President’s policies and favored positions thus
supplying a check against corruption. On the other hand, a stacked court under Menem unquestionably
supported government actions even to the point of altering opinions (Larkins, 1998). Rule of law is
important to a country for several reasons. First, rule of law, or, constitutional liberalism in Zakaria’s
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terms, protects the citizens by limiting the power of government (Zakaria, 1997). This limitation allows
protection against both corruption and usurpation of human and democratic rights. Second, a safeguard
against corruption is the equal and predictable application of the laws (Dobel, 1976), a situation that
cannot occur if the judiciary is corrupt. In fact, the judiciary cannot limit the powers of government
unless it blindly and predictably applies the laws. Finally, it has been asserted that without the fair
application of the rule of law the state cannot develop a fully operational market economy because
businesses will not be able to rely on the property protection they need to operate (Carothers, 1999). In
other words, the judiciary protects the rights and freedoms that stabilize the government and protect the
rights, human and democratic, of the citizenry as well as ensuring the environment that businesses need to
develop the economy. If corruption exists in the judiciary these protections will not be fairly applied and
the resulting inequality will undermine both the state and the economy (Heymens and Lipiez, 1999).
It can be argued that perceived corruption in the judiciary is at least as harmful, if not more so,
than actual corruption since the effects are the same but perceptions are not as easy to change as actions.
Mauro demonstrated a negative correlation between perceived corruption and investment indicating that a
belief that corruption exists is enough to deter investment and growth (Mauruo, 1995).4 Applying this
directly to the rule of law, Dobel argues that in order to be effective citizens must accept the laws, their
application, and adjudication (Dobel, 1976). When faith is lost in laws and the judiciary, other recourse is
found including, Dobel argues, the use violence to resolve conflicts. Therefore, while actual occurrences
of corruption may go unnoticed, the effectiveness of the judiciary is eroded once it is perceived to be
corrupt.
Another argument supporting the strength of perceived corruption is that actual occurrences of
corruption frequently remain hidden. Corruption flourishes in an environment without transparency or
accountability (Eigen, 2002) since it minimizes the risk of being discovered. However, this also prevents
insight into the exact extent of corruption (Heymens and Lipiez, 1999), thus preventing accurate
measurement of corruption. Conversely, corruption also deters transparency. When corruption is
prevalent political discourse and discussions are discouraged, media freedoms are limited, and education

8
is undermined (Dobel, 1976; Eigen, 2002). Consequently, avenues that would normally be used to ferret
out and report corruption are suppressed to ensure that corruption can continue. This is particularly true
in the judiciary, which, even in the best cases, is shrouded by secrecy and mystery. Since actual insight
into judicial proceedings is rarely possible, the legitimacy and fairness (ie. lack of corruption) of the
system must be perceived and believed by the citizens in order for them to trust the institution. Thus, a
perception of corruption within the judiciary undermines its ability to enforce and maintain the legitimacy
of the rule of law, which subsequently undermines the stability and effectiveness of the government and
prevents economic development of the state.

Causes of Corruption
Corruption, both overall and in the judiciary, has generally been linked to deficiencies in three
conditions: accountability, transparency, and equality. In order to understand how these factors impact
corruption it is important to understand what is meant by these three conditions. Of the three,
transparency is the hardest to define since the term is widely used in the literature but with an implicit
rather than explicit definition. The implied definition is that actions are available for public scrutiny
(Hammergin, 1999). Therefore, transparency will be defined here as the ability for citizens to access
accurate information about the actions of public officials. In terms of the judiciary this means that the
judicial process and decisions can be viewed by others and understood. Accountability has a variety of
definitions, two aspects of which are important to these efforts. The first is that, when authority is
delegated to an agent that agent is responsible to the principal for his actions (Downs, 1999). The
principal-agent relationship is applicable to the judiciary since judges are either appointed or elected to
their post. Second, and most simply, accountability is allowing scrutiny of a public official’s actions
(Pope, 2000). Transparency allows the scrutiny to occur. Equality as used here will mean equal
opportunity (Pope, 2000). The judiciary requires equal opportunity for resources and must provide equal
opportunity to all it serves.
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Deficiencies in accountability and transparency are closely linked as causes of corruption, yet
each makes a significant individual contribution. Accountability forces the government to focus on the
public interest rather than personal interests (Heymens and Lipiez, 1999; Eigen, 2002). Holding a
government accountable (i.e. responsible for its actions and subject to scrutiny) includes both the
implementation of effective monitoring tools (Heymens and Libpiez, 1999) and the involvement of the
public to question the government on the reported results (Eigen, 2002). Transparency provides insight
into the activities of government officials. When faced with reforms that open their actions to public
scrutiny corrupt officials are resistant, knowing that the transparency will increase the likelihood that they
are caught and decrease the opportunities for corruption (Carothers, 1999). Thus, the lack of either of
these qualities can foster corruption but the lack of both accountability and transparency is fertile ground
for corruption.
Inequality can foster corruption in two ways. Low government employee salaries are cited as one
of the primary sources of corruption (Eigen, 1996; Buscaglia and Dakolias, 1999;Heymens and Lipiez,
1999). When government employees see themselves subsisting below the level of the general public they
take the opportunity to supplement their income through the misuse of the positions. Yet corruption can
also occur when one group is prevented from equal access to the benefits of the state (Dobel, 1976). In
this case the underprivileged will support corrupt practices that allow them the access they need.
Corruption is also linked with deficiencies in trust and political will. Research has demonstrated
that where there is a high level of trust in an institution, such as the judiciary, there is a lower level of
corruption (Tonoyan, 2003). Therefore, building trust in a society’s legal institution is an important factor
in fighting corruption (Tonoyan, 2003). Political will in fighting corruption is a key method to building
the trust. From building support for anti-corruption activities, to sanctioning officials who engage in
corruption, to demonstrating an on-going effort in the battle against corruption, a society committed to
controlling corruption can work together to make the tough choices and changes necessary (Brinkerhoff,
1999). Conversely, the less demonstrated political will for fighting corruption the more corruption is
accepted in society. A prime example of this is Belgium. In the past Belgium has accepted corruption as
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the normal way of politics (Bull and Newell, 2003). Yet when politicians perceived that the legitimacy of
the government was falling, a concerted effort by all areas of the government was made to introduce and
enforce sweeping anti-corruption reform (Bull and Newell, 2003). The result has been reduced levels of
corruption, an increased lack of acceptance of corruption as normal in politics, and a gradual increase in
the trust of the government (Bull and Newell, 2003).
Studies have associated the same three causes to corruption in the judiciary. In order to prevent
corruption, the judiciary must be paid on par with other organizations (Buscaglia and Dakolia, 1999),
must be held accountable for their decisions both by higher courts and by the general public (Buscaglia
and Dakolia, 1999; World Bank, 2000), and, in order for the public to hold them accountable their actions
must be transparent. Where judicial corruption is concerned, inequality takes on special characteristics;
corruption will develop where laws can be applied inequitably (Buscaglia and Dakolia, 1999). This
affects corruption both in the overall state as well and in the judiciary. If a judge can be counted on to
apply laws based on the value of a side payment then there is not equality before the law. In this case,
both transparency and accountability are closely tied to ensuring equitable application of the law. It
follows that transparency and accountability impact perceived corruption. For example, the European
Union has noted that reform efforts in Poland have increased the efficiency of the judiciary but
recommends that Poland improve both public access to information and perceived corruption in the
judiciary.5
Correcting and preventing corruption in the judiciary, and the state, is, in theory, as simple as
correcting the three problems. Hold the institutions accountable, provide open access to information, and
ensure that government employees are paid fairly (Eigen, 2002). Buscaglia and Dakolia (1999)
demonstrated this by illustrating that the introduction of reforms, which included such aspects as
computer monitoring systems and a focus on short-term benefits to the judiciary, reduced the occurrence
of corruption in Ecuador and Chile.
Yet in practice controlling corruption in the judiciary is not that simple for two reasons. First,
although the judiciary must be held accountable it must also maintain its independence (Pope, 2000). In
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fact it is recommended that the judiciary be independent from both the executive and legislative branches
of government as well as the electorate (Pope, 2000). Consequently, the judiciary is faced with the
conundrum of being accountable to itself to prevent corruption. This becomes even more difficult when
the judiciary is expected to enforce anti-corruption laws that they may be violating (Dininio and Kpundeh,
1999). Consequently, the judiciary must be compelled to be accountable to itself and the public while
maintaining its independence, not an easy balance to achieve. Second, it is not always possible for the
judiciary to be completely transparent. For example, whistle blowing is seen as a key element in the fight
against corruption yet for this tool to be effective the whistle-blower must be protected (Dininio and
Kpundeh, 1999). Full transparency would prevent anonymity and open the whistle-blower to risk.
Consequently, a balance must be struck between a level of transparency that will foster the necessary
accountability while protecting information when needed, again a difficult task.
Therefore, implementing the common solutions to fighting corruption, both in general and in the
judiciary, may not guarantee an ethical judiciary, much less the citizen’s perception that the judiciary is
not corrupt. As mentioned, in his study of judicial corruption in Santiago, Chile and Quito, Ecuador
Buscaglia (1999) found that the implementation of judicial reforms was correlated with reduced reports of
corrupt practices. Based on this research, the difference between a country with a judiciary perceived to
be highly corrupt and one whose judiciary is not perceived to be corrupt should be the existence of
effective accountability and transparency measures in the judiciary. Yet it is possible that other factors,
such as personal experiences with the judiciary or the type of legal system, could have a strong influence
on perceived judicial corruption regardless of accountability and transparency. This thesis will test the
strength of this presumed correlation between perceived judicial corruption, accountability, and
transparency arguing that other factors are necessary to understand perceived judicial corruption.
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Perceived Judicial Corruption
As indicated above perceived corruption, and more specifically perceived judicial corruption,
undermines the stability and growth of a state. Organizations such as Transparency International have
developed a plan for fighting corruption, both overall and in the judiciary, which is based on
transparency, accountability, and equality. Theoretically, a judiciary that is held accountable for its
actions (for example, through judicial review by an appellate court), that is transparent (for example, by
providing internet access to decisions), and is equitable both in access to the system by the citizens (for
example, by publishing any charges required for court services in advance) and in compensation to the
judiciary (for example, by ensuring that the pay scale of judges is sufficient and comparable to other
professions) should not be corrupt and, therefore, should not be perceived to be corrupt. But is this the
case? Current research suggesting that this relationship might hold is based on an individual case study
(Buscaglia, 1999).
Data available from Transparency International, however, indicate that the relationship between
perceived corruption and the judiciary is not straightforward. Table 1 illustrates this point. For example,
almost 28% of people surveyed in Finland, which is rated as the least corrupt country according to
Transparency International, indicate that correcting corruption in the courts is more important than
correcting corruption in other public institutions, with only corruption in political parties being more of a
concern. On the other hand, less than 5% of the people surveyed in Nigeria, which is rated as the most
corrupt country by Transparency International, selected courts as their first choice institution for the
correction of corruption.6 Transparency International rates Poland and Mexico the same for overall
corruption yet 15% of the people surveyed in Poland are most concerned about corruption in the courts
compared to less than 7% of those surveyed in Mexico. These findings are supported by other surveys.7
According to the 1995 World Values Survey 24% of the Nigerian respondents had a great deal of
confidence in the legal system compared to less than 14% of Finnish respondents. The World Values
Survey also indicates a disparity between Poland, where 11% of the respondents have no confidence in
the legal system, and Mexico, where 25% of the respondents have no confidence in the legal system.8
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Table 1: Classification of Countries by Perceived Judicial Corruption and Perceived Overall
Corruption

Perceived Court Corruption
High

High

Perceived
Overall
Corruption

Low

Low

Country
Courts** CPI* Country
Courts** CPI*
Bulgaria
19.8
54 Costa Rica
8.6
50
Croatia
21.6
59 South Korea
10.3
50
Peru
35.0
59 Colombia
3.4
59
Poland
15.4
64 Mexico
6.6
64
Panama
15.0
66 Dominican Rep.
12.1
70
Bosnia
17.0
70 Turkey
6.6
77
Romania
20.2
83 India
3.8
83
Argentina
19.2
92 Russia
10.9
86
Macedonia
15.4
106 Guatemala
8.0
100
Indonesia
32.8
122 Nigeria
4.8
132
Georgia
18.1
124
Cameroon
31.0
124
Country
Courts** CPI* Country
Courts** CPI*
Finland
27.7
1 Netherlands
10.0
7
Denmark
16.3
3 Switzerland
9.8
8
Sweden
16.2
6 Canada
8.3
11
Norway
12.3
8 United Kingdom
8.6
11
Luxembourg
18.1
11 Austria
8.4
14
Israel
14.8
21 Germany
8.6
16
Spain
26.6
23 Ireland
8.8
18
Portugal
14.8
25 United States
9.1
18
Italy
18.0
35 Japan
3.7
21
Malaysia
8.5
37
South Africa
3.9
48

*CPI: Corruption Perception Index score
Source: Transparency International
**Courts: Percent who responded Courts when asked “If you had a magic wand and you could

eliminate corruption from one of the following institutions what would be your first choice?”
Source: Transparency International
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Is there something about the judiciary that is related to the different levels of concern about
corruption in the courts? What are the differences between the judiciary in the most corrupt country with
a high level of confidence in the legal system and the judiciary in the least corrupt country with a lower
level of confidence in the judiciary? What is different between the judiciaries of two countries that have
been rated the same for overall corruption by Transparency International but have different levels of
confidence in the legal system? It could be argued that there is a variance in the standard controls for
corruption, transparency, accountability, and equality, within these countries. An alternate argument
could be that some countries have more serious problems with corruption in areas other than the judiciary.
Neither of these arguments explains the lack of confidence in the judiciary despite a lack of concern about
corruption or the variances in concern about judicial corruption. In other words, they do not explain the
role of judicial legitimacy. Before this role is explored the factors influencing judicial legitimacy must be
understood.

Explaining Judicial Legitimacy
Since the judiciary cannot directly enforce its directives, it must rely on its legitimacy, or at least
the perception of legitimacy, to ensure compliance with its decisions and respect for the rule of law
particularly if the decision is not favorable (Tyler and Rasinski, 1991). Several studies on the relationship
between perceived legitimacy of the law and legal authorities indicate that when the process was
perceived to be fair judicial decisions and the legal authorities were accepted as legitimate regardless of
whether or not the outcome was perceived to be favorable (Tyler et al, 1991, 1989; Tyler, 2000, 1994).
Specifically, a study of the United States Supreme Court found that people accepted Supreme Court
decisions, whether or not they agreed with the decisions, because they perceived that the Supreme Court
made the decisions fairly (Tyler and Rasinski, 1991). An earlier study of the impact of judicial decisions
on the perception of legal legitimacy indicates that perceptions change incrementally through experience
(Tyler et al, 1989). Since a corrupt judiciary will result in unfair treatment it will decrease the legitimacy
of the judiciary and, in the extreme, undermine the rule of law (Tyler and Rasinski, 1991)
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Perceived corruption in the judiciary could originate from two directions;9 it could be the result of
actual evidence of corruption or it could be a manifestation of distrust in the judiciary. Actual evidence of
corruption can be documented, punished, and corrected by addressing the perpetrators. The cause of
distrust in the judiciary, on the other hand, is more difficult to isolate; it may be the result of a personal
encounter with the judiciary years ago or it may be a lack of understanding of the process. Whatever the
cause, correcting distrust in the judiciary is not as easy as punishing an act of corruption. Trust in the
institution must be rebuilt. Consequently it is important to understand factors that have been shown to
influence the legitimacy of the judiciary and how they interact with the standard corrections for
corruption – accountability and transparency. Three aspects of judicial legitimacy are relevant to this
study: public opinion of the judiciary; cultural influences; and, political influences. Although these three
aspects are not solely related to perceptions of corruption, they influence perceptions of and confidence in
the judiciary and, therefore, could be related to perceptions of judicial corruption.
Studies have shown that several factors directly influence the public’s confidence in the courts.
Judicial activism, protection of the rights of the accused, and inflation are shown to turn public opinion
against the United States Supreme Court (Caldeira, 1986). On the other hand, public awareness of court
actions and presidential popularity are shown to move public opinion in favor of the US Supreme Court
(Caldeira, 1986). These findings are consistent with public opinion studies, which show that news media,
presidents, and interest groups impact public opinion (Page, Shapiro, Dempsey, 1987). These influences
on public opinion of courts appear to be true in other countries as indicated by studies of opinions of the
European Court of Justice, which show evidence that support of the Court of Justice increases with
awareness but when information about the court is not available support for the court will be based on
support of other factors (Caldeira and Gibson, 1995). Therefore, it is possible that transparency will
increase support for the judiciary regardless of levels of corruption. It is also possible that attitudes
toward the national leader will impact perceptions of corruption in the judiciary.
Culture may also influence confidence in the judiciary. Although confidence in the legal system
is not the same as perceived corruption, it can be argued that a symptom of corruption would be a loss of
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confidence in the legal system. This is supported by the argument made above that institutions with low
levels of corruption have high levels of trust (Tonoyan, 2003). Arguably, when the public trusts the
judiciary they have confidence in the judiciary. Similarly when the public lacks trust in the judiciary they
also lack confidence in the judiciary. And, since a relationship between levels of trust and levels of
corruption has been demonstrated (Tonoyan, 2003), it is important to understand factors, such as culture,
which impact confidence in the judiciary since the same factors could also be related to perceived judicial
corruption. Both education and social class are shown to influence support for legal institutions in Europe
(Gibson and Caldeira, 1996), which would be reflected in the measures of confidence in the legal system.
Studies in El Salvador and Guatemala indicate that a low level of interpersonal trust in the culture is
reflected by a lack of trust in institutions, including the judiciary (Mainwaring and Welna, 2003). General
differences within the culture have also been shown to negatively impact support for legal institutions. A
study of differences in support for European legal institutions indicated that the more divided a society
was along the lines of ethnicity and language, or the less modern the society was, the more negatively the
legal system is viewed (Gibson and Caldeira, 1996). The negative impact of cultural differences is also
demonstrated in a study of the support for courts within South Africa (Gibson and Caldeira, 2003), as
well as a study of the acceptance of judicial decisions in multicultural societies (Tyler, 2000). It is
therefore possible that perceptions of corruption in the judiciary would be influenced by education, a
culture of trust, significant cultural differences, and modernization of the society, none of which are
included in either transparency or accountability. Therefore, it will be important to control for these
factors in the quantitative tests.
Finally, political influences impact support for the judiciary. Although support for the judiciary is
not the same as perceived corruption, its importance to this study is similar to the importance of
confidence in the judiciary. As mentioned above, low levels of corruption in an institution have been
associated with high levels of trust in that institution (Tonoyan, 2002). Arguably, an institution that is not
trusted is most likely not supported. Therefore, it is likely that corrupt institutions would be neither
trusted nor supported. Consequently, it is plausible that factors that influence support for the judiciary
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could be associated with perceived judicial corruption. Studies of the South African courts and the
European Court of Justice have shown that courts must be visible to the public and earn its support
(Caldeira and Gibson, 1995; Gibson and Caldeira, 2003). Yet there is indication that courts recognize the
need for legitimacy and act to increase their legitimacy. Although lack of judicial legitimacy could have
many causes, one cause could be judicial corruption. Arguably, if low corruption in an institution is
related to high levels of trust in that institution (Tonoy, 2003), the institution would also have a high
degree of legitimacy. Conversely, an institution with high levels of corruption would have low levels of
trust and low levels of judicial legitimacy. A study of the Philippine Supreme Court indicates that it may
be enhancing its legitimacy by serving a redistributive function by protecting the underprivileged
(Haynie, 1992). State leaders also indicate an understanding of the need for judicial legitimacy. A study
of supreme courts in three countries (India, Pakistan, and The Philippines) undergoing a political crisis
that resulted in establishment of an authoritarian government indicates that the courts were left
independent initially to ensure that both the leader and the rule of law within the state would maintain
legitimacy (Tate, 1992). However, if the court subsequently threatened the leader then the scope of the
court was reduced thereby allowing the leader to control the court without completely eliminating
legitimacy (Tate, 1992). While of itself the limiting of courts by the regime leader might not impact
perceptions of the courts, coupled with the fact that the popularity of leaders is known to influence
opinions of the court, perceptions of the courts in crisis regimes may be even more significantly
influenced. Thus, while publicity to increase judicial legitimacy corresponds to transparency, court
actions to increase legitimacy or state actions to limit the courts are not covered by the traditional
corruption remedies. Therefore, consideration will need to be given to these factors.

Judicial Reform
The importance of preventing and correcting judicial corruption, and the important role the
judiciary has in preventing and correcting overall corruption, has been noticed. Groups such as
Transparency International, the World Bank, and USAID have developed and implemented judicial
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reform programs in various countries. These programs have focused on both infrastructure (buildings,
supplies) and education (training of the judges as well as lawyers). Sadly, these programs have neither
corrected judicial corruption nor increased confidence in the judiciary. The efforts in Latin America serve
as testimony to the failure of reforms. In Peru, efforts by the World Bank to reform the judiciary were
undermined by Fujimori (Doing, 1999). Both citizens and elites in Guatemala and El Salvador remain
skeptical of the judiciary after the implementation of judicial reforms in those countries (Mainwaring and
Welna, 2003). Another study of judicial reform in Latin America indicates that increasing judicial
independence only served to increase opportunities for judicial corruption (Hammergren, 2000;
Mainwaring and Welna, 2003).
Since these efforts were based on the importance of transparency, accountability, and equality,
the results suggest that the standard reforms are not sufficient to control either judicial corruption or
perceived judicial corruption. Groups experienced in judicial reform implemented reforms that are
commonly believed to improve the judiciary yet, neither judicial legitimacy nor judicial corruption were
significantly improved. Since the result is that the citizens still do not have a judiciary that they can trust
to uphold the law fairly and equitably, the benefits of the reform efforts are called into question.
However, these results are enlightening because they support the idea that correcting perceived judicial
corruption is a necessary condition for the development of an effective and legitimate judiciary. It could
be argued that, had the problems underlying the lack of judicial legitimacy and perceived judicial
corruption in these three countries been corrected, reforms efforts would have, at a minimum, maintained
that legitimacy or, in the best case, increased judicial legitimacy. Yet, until there is a better understanding
of the factors influencing judicial legitimacy and perceived judicial corruption the reforms necessary to
correct these problems cannot be developed. One step, which will be undertaken in the next section, is to
better understand variations in perceived judicial corruption.
In summary, a review of the extant literature reveals that opinions of judicial legitimacy are both
driven by perceived corruption and drive perceptions of judicial corruption. Since several factors, which
are shown to influence opinion of judicial legitimacy, are not included in the traditional responses to
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corruption (accountability and transparency), they will need to be included as the perceptions of judicial
corruption are tested. Exploring the impact of these variables will improve our understanding of the
dynamics of perceived judicial corruption. In particular, education, wealth (which can be used as a proxy
for social development and redistributive needs), modernization of society, cultural diversity, popularity
of the state leader, and regime type will be included in the testing.

Hypotheses
As argued above, actual occurrences of corruption are hard to measure since it is in the best
interests of the actors involved to hide corrupt acts. Therefore, this thesis will draw upon measures of
perceived corruption, in particular, those provided by Transparency International. Three hypotheses will
be tested.
The first hypothesis, which will determine whether or not there is a relationship between overall
corruption and corruption in the judiciary, is that as perceived overall corruption increases perceived
judicial corruption increases. It is important to understand this relationship to ensure that perceived
judicial corruption cannot be explained away as a consequence of perceived overall corruption. The logic
supporting this hypothesis, that perceived judicial corruption is correlated with a loss of legitimacy for the
rule of law which leads to an increase in overall corruption, is based studies that demonstrate a
relationship between actual judicial corruption and decreased business investment. Businesses will avoid
investing in countries with high levels of corruption for two reasons. First, the increased transaction costs
associated with corruption decreases the profit available to the business. The argument proceeds that as
business in the country declines corruption becomes an avenue to supplement income, including judicial
income. Second, if the judiciary in particular is corrupt it cannot guarantee the legal protections
associated with contracts, patents, trademarks, and intellectual properties that businesses demand. This
hypothesis will also serve as a control for a direct link between generally perceived corruption and
perceived judicial corruption. There are two reasons why the two perceptions may be directly linked.
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First, the judiciary may be guilty by association. Because citizens perceive a high degree of corruption in
the country, they might implicate the judiciary, whether or not it deserves it, because it is an institution of
the country. Second, it may be that judiciaries in countries with high levels of corruption are more likely
to also be corrupt. To accept this hypothesis a positive, statistically significant relationship must exist
between perceived overall corruption and perceived judicial corruption.
The second hypothesis, which will test the effectiveness of the generally accepted controls for
corruption, asserts that as the level of judicial transparency and accountability increase the level of
perceived judicial corruption decreases. A concern with this hypothesis is that it is attempting to project
individual perceptions onto the overall population. However, it is the aggregate of individual preferences
that determines the viability of the judiciary. If a minority of the population perceives the judiciary to be
corrupt some of the time the overall judiciary will still be respected as legitimate. Conversely, if the
majority of the population perceives the judiciary to be corrupt, judicial legitimacy will be in question
despite the support of the minority. The logic behind this hypothesis is that corruption can only exist in
hiding; therefore, the more opportunity there is to view the judicial process the less opportunity there is
for corrupt acts to go undetected. Because a judicial system can have different types of transparency, this
hypothesis will test three different methods that could be used to view the activities of the judicial system.
First, access to judicial opinions provides the public insight into judicial logic and consistency. Even if
all opinions are made available to the public, it is reasonable to expect that only a select few will take
advantage of the availability. However, it is a reasonable expectation that availability of judicial opinions
demonstrates that the judiciary is not attempting to hide its actions. Second, the more opportunity the
public has to participate in the judicial process the more they can observe how the judiciary works.
Again, this is making the assumption that the more the public can see of the judicial process the less they
will perceive that the judiciary is attempting to hide its actions. Finally, the press can serve as a liaison
between the judiciary and the public on a regular basis by reporting trials, decisions, and actions of the
judiciary in terms that are easily understood by the public. Yet, a government-controlled press can be
expected to suppress reporting of corrupt actions by the judiciary. Therefore, a free press increases
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transparency. The hypothesis will be supported if there is a negative relationship between the method of
judicial transparency and perceived judicial corruption.
Similarly, there can be a variety of methods used to hold the judiciary accountable either to the
government or to a legal body. Unfortunately, this is a double-edged sword since an independent
judiciary is necessary both to prevent and judge corruption. Two methods that are used to strike the
balance between an independent and accountable judiciary will be used for the purposes of this study.
First, the judiciary can be held accountable to the government if the government has the ability to remove
justices for cause. Countries where another arm of government has the ability to remove judges for
specific actions or types of actions will be considered to have a higher degree of accountability. A second
method that is used to hold judges accountable for their actions is judicial oversight. In this situation, an
independent legal organization monitors the actions of judges and takes appropriate measures where
necessary. Existence of a judicial oversight mechanism will also be considered a situation with increased
accountability. As with transparency, the hypothesis will be supported if there is a negative relationship
between the method of accountability and perceived judicial corruption.
It is also possible that type of legal system used by the country influences perceived judicial
corruption. This impact will be assessed with the third hypothesis which states that perceived judicial
corruption will be lower in countries based on a civil law legal system than in countries based on a
common law legal system. Civil law legal systems are code based and the role of the judiciary is to apply
the code to the situation. Therefore, the laws are clearly defined and judges are limited in their ability to
interpret the law. Conversely, common law systems are based on case law and, therefore, allow judges
wider latitude for interpretation. Because interpretation could be used to support corrupt acts the
argument will be made that civil law systems are more likely to deter corruption. A counter argument
could be made the common law system’s reliance on precedent would be more likely to deter corruption
since it would highlight inconsistencies. However, the selection of precedent is also, arguably, an
interpretation and, therefore, could be used to hide or support corruption. This hypothesis will be
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supported if there is a negative, statistically significant relationship between judicial corruption and civil
law systems.
Some countries accommodate religious law and courts to handle family law, although
adjudication of this law only occurs in a limited set of courts in the country. However, since religious law
and its jurisdiction would personally impact a broad range of citizens it is possible that it influences
perceived judicial corruption. Therefore, a corollary to the third hypothesis will be that perceived judicial
corruption will be higher in countries that have religious law. This hypothesis will be supported if there
is a negative, statistically significant relationship between judicial corruption and civil law systems.
In summary, the following three hypotheses will be tested in this study:

H1: As perceived state corruption increases perceived judicial corruption increases.
H2: As judicial transparency and accountability increase perceived judicial corruption decreases.
H3: Perceived judicial corruption will be lower in countries with a civil law system.
H3A: Perceived judicial corruption will be higher in countries with religious law.

It might be argued that these hypotheses are attempting to explain individual perceptions through
aggregate results. This is not untrue. However, since this is a first attempt at a quantitative, crossnational study the availability of data is limited. The ideal study would use individual surveys to identify
the reasons for each individual’s perception of corruption in the judicial system. Although the available
data does not reach that ideal, the data for both perceptions of corruption and perceptions of judicial
corruption is survey based. Since an in-depth survey requires an understanding of the questions to ask,
this study contributes to that effort by identifying factors that vary with perceptions of judicial corruption
and, therefore, can be used as the basis for future survey questions. Furthermore,, the goal of this study is
to understand how the features of the judiciary impact the overall perception of corruption in the
judiciary. It is probable that, no matter what is done or how infallible the judiciary, some portion of the
population will perceive it to be corrupt. Conversely, some portion of the population will believe in the
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judiciary despite numerous documented incidents of corruption. Problems occur when perceptions of
corruption are widespread. This study will add to an understanding of the causes of widespread perceived
judicial corruption.

Data and Methods
The dependent variable across the three hypotheses is perceived judicial corruption. Judicial
corruption perceived by the citizens is important because, as argued above, if citizens do not feel that they
can get redress through the judiciary they will find alternate avenues for their complaints. Transparency
International’s Global Corruption Barometer survey asks citizens to indicate the importance of eradicating
corruption across several institutions including courts.10 Although this provides a measure of perceptions
of the importance of corruption it is not without problems. Since this a measure of the perceived
importance of judicial corruption as compared to other institutions within the same country it may be
reflecting a particular situation within the country. For example, in a very poor country it may be possible
that receiving medical services without having to pay a bribe is more important to citizens than corruption
in the judiciary whereas in a developed country adequate medical services are readily available and,
therefore, corrupt medical services do not
Eight independent variables are used to test the hypotheses. The first is perceived overall
corruption, which is measured as the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index Ranking
(CPI).11 This is the independent variable in the first hypothesis. The next three variables measure
transparency, which is one of the two independent variables in the second hypothesis. By reporting on
the decisions of the judiciary, including both positive and negative aspects, the media offer transparency
into the judiciary that is accessible to most citizens. But in order for the media to provide effective
transparency there must be a high level of freedom of the press. Therefore, the second independent
variable is the Freedom House Freedom of the Press score.12 It might be argued that transparency
requires the ability of citizens to access information about the court cases. However, if the press can
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freely report on the cases the information will be available to the citizens. Consequently, Freedom of the
Press will be serving a dual measurement purpose.13 The third independent variable is whether or not
citizens can review judicial decisions. 14 Another measure of transparency, and the fourth independent
variable, is the level of citizen involvement in the judicial process.15 The fifth independent variable is the
final transparency variable and is a measure of judicial review. This variable includes a measure of both
appeals through the legal system and an independent or peer review of cases.16 The next two independent
variables are used to measure accountability. The first measure of accountability, and sixth independent
variable, is whether or not justices are subject to removal from office if they violate laws.17 Another
measure of accountability, and seventh independent variable, is whether the behavior of judges is subject
to review by an oversight group. 18 The eighth independent variable is the independent variable in the
third hypothesis and is the type of legal system. Legal systems can be classified as common law, civil
law, religious law, traditional law, or mixed. This hypothesis will be tested with both civil law and
religious law.

Controls
As explained above several factors can influence the opinion of the legitimacy of the courts that
are not included in the standard corrections for corruption (e.g. transparency and accountability).
Although legitimacy is not the same as corruption and my have causes other than corruption, it is
plausible that increased levels of corruption could lead to decreased judicial legitimacy. As a result, this
study will control for effects of legitimacy.
Three control variables will be used in the hypothesis tests. The first control variable is wealth,
measured as the per capita GDP for the country. Per capita GDP is being used to ensure a measure of
individual wealth rather than overall country wealth, which would be indicated by base GDP. The
difference is being made to reflect the relationship between low salaries and corruption, since corruption
has been shown to be more prevalent at lower levels of income (Eigen, 1996). Cultural diversity is the
second control variable. Although this could be measured in several different ways, for the purposes of
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this study it will be measured as the number of official languages in the state.19 Measuring cultural
diversity in this way will miss situations where the same language is spoken but there are other aspects
that render certain groups culturally distinct. However, language cleavages are arguably the most difficult
to bridge since a difference in language makes communication more difficult. Using this measure also
captures those instances where other features are similar except the language, such as the English/French
divide in Canada. The importance of common language in the legal system is supported by the fact that
the United States was found in violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations by the
International Court of Justice when Mexican nationals were not immediately notified of their right to
Consular notification immediately upon arrest despite the fact that Spanish is one of the two recognized
languages in the United States.20 Third, popularity of the state leader is measured as support for the
leader.21
Although prior research suggests additional controls, such as education, modernization, and
regime type, it was found that these were correlated with the controls listed above (GDP, cultural
diversity, and support for the leader). Education, which has been related to trust in the legal system
(Gibson and Caldeira, 1996), can be operationalized as the number of years of schooling completed by
children. Previous studies operationalized traditional versus modern societies as commitment to religion
(Gibson and Caldeira, 1996) however very religious societies, such as Israel, can also be very modern
which may skew the data. .22 Since Internet access requires both technology infrastructure and personal
technology acceptance it measures both the modernization of the state as a whole and individual
acceptance of modern technologies, and is used to represent modernization in this study. Finally, regime
type is measured based on whether or not the government is listed by Freedom House as democratic.23 A
Pearson Correlation indicates that, as operationalized above, education, internet availability, and regime
type are correlated with Real GDP per capita at a statistically significant level.24 In addition, there is also
a strong correlation between Real GDP per capita and freedom of the press.25 Given the strong
correlation of these variables, including all of them in the models would likely result in the results of the
models being understated and acceptance that there is not a relationship when one existed. Conversely,
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not including the variables in the models increase the risk that explanatory variables are ignored. To
resolve this dilemma all models were regressed with and without the correlated variables and a Block F
Test was performed to determine the impact of the correlated variables. For all models the Block F Test
failed to achieve statistical significance indicating that the correlated variables added little explanatory
power to the models. Therefore, GDP per capita will be the control variable used to represent wealth,
modernization, education, and regime type. Also, since Freedom of the Press is a transparency measure,
when it is used in the model real GDP per capita will be excluded. It is acknowledged that these variables
are not an exact proxy for the variables being dropped however the resulting model will be generally
representative as well as parsimonious.
These controls will serve two purposes. First, they will ensure that the measure of perceived
corruption is a function of corruption rather than a function of other influences. This is considered true if
the control variables do not achieve statistical significance when the hypotheses are tested. However, if
any of these variables achieve statistical significance then they must be considered as explanations for
perceived corruption. Therefore, these variables will help provide explanations as to why the hypotheses
are not true.

Empirical Tests
A statistical test of the hypotheses is done using Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis. The
advantage of this method is that it will identify the individual impact of one variable on the dependent
variable holding all other variables constant, assess its statistical significance, and provide a measure of
the variation explained by the model. There are, unfortunately, two disadvantages. First, several of the
variables are dichotomous or scalar which limits the explanatory power of the statistical model. Second,
correlation does not necessarily mean causation. Therefore, care must be taken in extrapolating the
results of the variables. Since the hypotheses are testing current perceptions of corruption a single crosssectional sampling of the data has been taken. This method was chosen for two reasons. First, there is
little variation in the CPI scores and rankings over the last five years indicating that there would be little
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benefit from doing a time-series analysis of the data. Second, this study attempts to identify what causes
variations in perceived judicial corruption. By looking at a single point in time, analysis can be done on
the variations existing at the chosen point in time.
Two cautions must be noted. First, the data used in this study is limited and imperfect. While
this will prevent decisive conclusions it will provide insight for future research. Second, although the
dependent variable, perceived judicial corruption, is at an individual level the independent variables, such
as GDP and legal system, are measured at a country level. This implies that aggregate measures can
explain individual perceptions. Given the limited nature of available data, the research objective is to
identify perceptual patterns and to begin the process of empirically isolating the causes of cross-national
variation.
The tests of the hypotheses will proceed in two subsections. First, the results of the empirical
tests will be reported without interpretation or discussion to allow the reader to assess the validity of the
tests. Interpretation and discussion of the results will be done in the second section. This will be
followed by a test the hypotheses against the comparative cases.

Hypotheses Tested
Results of the first hypothesis, that perceived judicial corruption increases as perceived corruption
increases, are displayed in Table 2. As can be seen none of the variables achieve statistical significance at
the p < .05 level, although Real GDP per capita falls just short of the threshold. The direction and
magnitude of the relationship merits attention. All variables demonstrate a negative relationship,
indicating that perceived judicial corruption increases as perceived overall corruption, number of
languages (cultural diversity), real GDP per capita, and support of the current government decrease.
Furthermore, a one-point change in any of the values will result in less than half a point change in
perceived judicial corruption. Based on the R2 the model would only correctly predict 13% of the
variance in the dependent variable. Therefore, this hypothesis must be rejected in favor of the null
hypothesis.
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Table 2: Regression Analysis of Perceived Judicial Corruption
Dependent Variable: Perceived Judicial Corruption
b
Independent Variables
(se)
Constant
32.908**
(9.680)
Perceived Overall Corruption*
-.134
(.081)
Languages
-.144
(.504)
Real GDP per capita
-.001
(.000)
Government Support
-.393
(.302)
R2
Adjusted R2
F
N
p < .01

.133
.013
1.261
43

*Operationalized as the CPI rank.
The test of the second hypothesis, that perceived judicial corruption decreases with increased
levels of transparency and accountability, is presented in Table 3. In this model only one of the
independent variables, the ability to remove judges, is statistically significant at the p < .05 level. Again,
the direction of the variables is worthy of note.

Perceived judicial corruption increases at lower levels of

citizen participation and judicial oversight as expected. However, perceived judicial corruption also
increases as the ability to remove judges and the breadth of judicial review increase. This model is also
more predictive than the model used to test the first hypothesis since it is able to predict 24% of the
dependent variable. The strong impact of the variables is also important. The change from citizens not
participating to participating at some level decreases judicial corruption by 2 points. Moving from no
ability to review or remove judges to holding judges accountable at some level increases perceived
judicial corruption by more than 3 points each. And moving from having no oversight to having at least
some level of oversight will decrease perceived judicial corruption by 1.5 points. The accountability
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aspect of the second hypothesis can thus be accepted although the transparency aspect must be rejected in
favor of the null hypothesis.

Table 3: Regression Analysis of Transparency and Accountability
Dependent Variable: Perceived Judicial Corruption
b
Independent Variables
(se)
Constant
Citizen Participation
Judge Review
Judge Removal
Oversight
Languages
Freedom House Press Freedom
Government Support
R2
Adjusted R2
F
N
*p < .05

12.229 *
(5.819)
-2.170
(2.080)
3.149
(3.925)
3.729*
(1.585)
-1.560
(2.012)
-.412
(.520)
-.040
(.087)
.267
(.301)

.245
.042
1.208
43

Tests for the third hypothesis, that perceived judicial corruption is lower in countries with a civil
law system, are displayed in Table 4. This model is less predictive than the model testing hypothesis two
by predicting 19% of the variance in the dependent variable, but it is still more predictive than the first
hypothesis. Civil law is statistically significant at the p < .05 level and in the anticipated direction;
perceived judicial corruption will be 7 points higher in civil law countries all other things being equal.
Therefore, the third hypothesis concerning civil law can be accepted.
The results of the test of the corollary for the third hypothesis, that perceived judicial corruption
will be higher in countries with religious law, are presented in Table 5. As can be seen, the results parallel
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the results of the civil law hypothesis. The religious law variable achieves statistical significance and the
coefficient is negative indicating that countries with religious law have increased perceptions of judicial
corruption. The magnitude of this difference is also striking; perceived judicial corruption in countries
with religious law will be 11 points lower all other things held constant. Therefore, this corollary
hypothesis can also be accepted.

Table 4: Regression Analysis of Legal System
Dependent Variable: Perceived Judicial Corruption
b
Independent Variables
(se)
Constant
8.553*
(3.971)
Civil Law
7.645*
(3.047)
Languages
.164
(.493)
Freedom House Press Freedom
-.079
(.080)
Government Support
.101
(.270)
R2
Adjusted R2
F
N
* p < .05

.195
.084
1.758
43
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Table 5: Regression Analysis of Legal System
Dependent Variable: Perceived Judicial Corruption
b
Independent Variables
(se)
Constant
14.664 **
(2.922)
Religious Law
-11.050 *
(4.849)
Languages
.347
(.530)
Freedom House Press Freedom
-.017
(.080)
Government Support
-.157
(.270)
R2
Adjusted R2
F
N
**p < .001 * p < .05

.169
.055
1.476
43

Discussion
Two points were indicated by the statistical analysis. First, the type of legal system is statistically
significant and has a strong impact on perceived judicial corruption. Since civil law is code based law it
was expected that knowledge and understanding of the law would lead to decreased perceptions of
judicial corruption since the actions of the judiciary could be judged against stated codes, an expectation
supported by the model. Conversely, religious law had an inverse relationship to perceived judicial
corruption, indicating that the presence of religious law in the legal system is associated with higher
levels of perceived judicial corruption. This indicates that the type of legal system influences perceptions
of judicial corruption, an influence ignored by the standard solutions of accountability and transparency.
Second, the only accountability variable to reach statistical significance was the ability to remove judges,
although the relationship was opposite expectations. According to the model, perceived judicial
corruption increases with the ability to remove judges. One possible explanation for the direction of this
relationship is that if a judge is removed for corruption other members of the judiciary are guilty by
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association. An alternate explanation is that the ability to remove judges was introduced to the country
either as a result of past experiences with judicial corruption or because the country is concerned about
controlling judicial usurpation of power. Additional research is required to better understand this
relationship.
Although the models do not fully explain the perception of judicial corruption (as indicated by the
low predictive ability of most models), these results are not surprising for two reasons. First, as
mentioned, general perceptions are much harder to predict than the relationship between specific
perceptions and specific actions. Second, the model is attempting to explain an aggregate perception.
Rather than attempting to explain why a single citizen, or even a specific group of citizens, perceives a
judiciary to be corrupt, this model is assessing the perceptions of the citizens of country. Therefore, the
influences on these perceptions can be as broad as the characteristics of the citizens and their experiences.
Despite these problems this statistical exercise has demonstrated that perceived judicial
corruption is influenced by more than just transparency and accountability. The comparative studies that
follow will attempt to validate these statistical findings and further clarify the factors that influence
perceived judicial corruption.

Comparative Cases
Assessing the statistical relationship between various attributes of corruption is enlightening, but
it does not indicate why citizens in some countries perceive more judicial corruption than citizens in other
countries, particularly in conjunction with the overall level of corruption. One answer could be that a
society with high levels of corruption will choose to eliminate corruption in areas that most impact their
daily lives such as the police, utilities, or medical services. Yet this answer does not explain those
countries that have the same level of perceived overall corruption but differ significantly in their concern
with judicial corruption. Consequently, specific comparisons are made to identify factors that may be
contributing to these perceptions.
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The original hypothesis is that countries with high levels of overall corruption would be more
likely to have higher levels of perceived corruption in the judiciary. Using the Transparency International
Corruption Perception Index as a measure of overall corruption and the Global Corruption Barometer as a
measure of judicial corruption, countries were ranked according to high and low levels of judicial and
overall corruption.26 The results are displayed in Table 6. Several points are noticeable. First, the
location of two countries, Finland and Nigeria, is surprising. Finland is ranked as having the least
corruption yet only three other countries have a higher level of judicial corruption. Nigeria is just the
opposite. It ranks as having the highest level of overall corruption yet has the fourth lowest level of court
corruption. Second, there is a pattern of country placement. The Eastern European countries are
clustered in the high corruption/high judicial corruption category. The low corruption/high judicial
corruption category contains primarily Western European and Scandinavian countries most of which
belong to the European Union. Third, several countries that rank identically in corruption overall have
significantly different (two or more times) levels of perceived judicial corruption. Most notable are Israel
and Japan, Colombia and Peru, and Poland and Mexico.
These results raise several questions. What causes countries to have the same overall perceived
general corruption but different perceived judicial corruption? Why do the Scandinavian countries have
such perceived high judicial corruption? Why does Nigeria have such low perceived judicial corruption?
The more narrowly focused, case intensive portion of this thesis will attempt to answer these questions
through a more thorough inspection of the judiciary of these countries driven by the hypotheses already
presented. Three situations are researched. The first is the situation where there is perceived high overall
corruption (ranked 120 or above) but differences in perceived judicial corruption (more than twice the
perceived level of judicial corruption). Nigeria (overall corruption ranking 132; judicial corruption 4.8) is
compared to Cameroon (overall corruption ranking 124; judicial corruption 12.4). These countries were
chosen both because they are at the highest level of overall corruption and because they are
geographically in the same area. The common geography helps narrow the variations in political history
and development. Both of these countries were under colonial rule, both achieved independence in 1960,

34
Table 6: Ranking of Countries by Perceived Judicial Corruption, Perceived Overall Corruption,
High Confidence in the Legal System, and No Confidence in the Legal System
Perceived Court Corruption
High
Country
Bulgaria
Croatia
Peru
Poland
Panama
High

Perceived
Overall
Corruption

Low

Bosnia
Romania
Argentina
Macedonia
Indonesia
Georgia
Cameroon
Country
Finland
Denmark
Sweden
Norway
Luxembrg
Israel
Spain
Portugal
Italy

Court

Low
CPI

19.8
21.6
35.0
15.4
15.0

54
59
59
64
66

17.0
20.2
19.2
15.4
32.8
18.1
31.0
Court
s
27.7
16.3
16.2
12.3

70
83
92
106
122
124
124
CPI

18.1
14.8
26.6
14.8
18.0

11
21
23
25
35

1
3
6
8

High
Conf
9.2
9.6
7.1
11.9

No
Conf.
25.2
6.7
28.1
10.7

20.4

4.8

7.1
11.1

25.2
27.1

3.1

22.5

High
Conf.
13.8

No
Conf.
5.4

7.0
9.6

4.4
3

7.9

11.6

Country
Costa Rica
South Korea
Colombia
Mexico
Dominican
Rep.
Turkey
India
Russia
Guatemala
Nigeria

Country
Netherlands
Switzerland
Canada
United
Kingdom
Austria
Germany
Ireland
United States
Japan
Malaysia
South Africa

Court

CPI

8.6
10.3
3.4
6.6
12.1

50
50
59
64
70

6.6
3.8
10.9
8.0
4.8

77
83
86
100
132

Court
s
10.0
9.8
8.3
8.6
8.4
8.6
8.8
9.1
3.7
8.5
3.9

CPI
7
8
11
11
14
16
18
18
21
37
48

High
Conf.

No
Conf.

8.8
14.7
10.2
4.0

5.9
17.8
25.5
29.2

29.8
22.2
8.6

12.1
4.8
19.2

24.0

13.4

High
Conf.

No
Conf.

9.8

6.1

6.3
16.5

13.1
1.7

20.1

13.2

CPI: Corruption Perception Index score
Source: Transparency International
Courts: Percent who responded Courts when asked “If you had a magic wand and you could

eliminate corruption from one of the following institutions what would be your first choice?”
Source: Transparency International
High Conf: Percent responding that they had a high degree of confidence in the courts.
Source: World Values Survey
No Conf: Percent responding that they had no confidence in the courts.
Source: World Values Survey
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and both are struggling to transition to democracy.27 The second situation is that of low perceived overall
corruption (ranked 7 or below) and differences in perceived judicial corruption. This situation will
compare Finland (perceived corruption ranked 27.7, the fourth highest of all the countries) with the
Netherlands (perceived corruption ranked 10). Both countries are members of the European Union (the
Netherlands was a founding member and Finland joined in 1995) and have accepted the Euro28 and,
therefore, are subject to high financial standards. Both countries are also members of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).29 Both are given the highest ratings for both political
rights and civil liberties by Freedom House. 30 Given these similarities it would be expected that
perceived judicial corruption would be similar. Finally, there is the situation where countries are ranked
identically for overall corruption yet very differently for judicial corruption. Mexico and Poland have
very different backgrounds but rate the same in perceived overall corruption while having more than
twice the difference in perceived judicial corruption (Mexico’s ranking is 6.6 while Poland’s is 15. 4).
These countries are both members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD),31 share the same Freedom House Civil Liberties and Freedom ratings,32 and both are considered
republics.33 Yet there are differences. Poland is still considered both a “nation in transit” and a
democratic country according to Freedom House.34 Conversely, although Mexico is not considered “in
transit” Freedom House ranks it as having a “restricted democratic practice”35 reflecting the control of
elections and access to the media by a dominate political party. Based on these similarities and
differences it might be expected that these two countries would either have similar perceived judicial
corruption or, since Mexico is rated as a “restricted” democracy, that Mexico’s perceived judicial
corruption would be higher.
These countries will be compared in two ways. First, the variables used for the quantitative
portion of the study will be compared across each of these countries. This will provide insight into the
individual variances of the variables. Second, looking at a limited set of countries allows more in-depth
analysis of the judicial systems. This allows a refinement of the third hypothesis that perceived judicial
corruption is influenced by the legal system. Internationally, a range of judicial options is being applied
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to particular cases. Truth and reconciliation committees and special tribunals are being used to bring
justice to post conflict countries. Countries under military influence allow military courts greater
jurisdiction. Since it is possible that these types of courts can influence the perception of corruption,
these countries will be compared on whether or not they have experienced alternate judicial impacts. And
since alternate judicial experiences such as Truth and Reconciliation Commissions and International
Criminal Tribunal are implemented to bring justice for extreme human rights violations and are operated
under the supervision of the United Nations, it will be expected that they will result in decreased
perceived judicial corruption. This will be tested with the sub-hypothesis that an alternate judicial
experience will decrease perceived judicial corruption. A second comparative variable will be the scope
of military courts. Countries with a military also have a military court. However, the jurisdiction of the
military court may differ between countries being limited only to military actions at a minimum and
encompassing civilian action at a maximum. By nature, military courts are less transparent than civilian
courts and, therefore, the sub-hypothesis that increased use of military courts will increase perceived
judicial corruption. Finally, many countries today are in the process of transition. Some are ending a
civil conflict. Some are transitioning from communism to democracy. And some are struggling to
consolidate democracy. One implication of these changes is that the judicial system in existence today
may be the result of recent changes. The change in judicial systems, the prior judicial system, or both
may impact perceived judicial corruption. If there is an impact, it is reasonable to expect that the
influence of the impact will last roughly one generation, which, for the purposes of this study, will be
equated with 20 years. This change can be the result of the overthrow of a repressive government, as is
the case in Eastern European countries, in which case it would be expected that there would be a decrease
in perceived corruption. However, the change could also be the result of a leader implementing changes
to assure the support of the judiciary, as was the case in Latin America (Finkel, 2004). Therefore, this
will be tested with the sub-hypothesis that a variation in judicial system within the last 20 years will be
associated with a variation in perceived judicial corruption.
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Table 7: Comparative Analysis Variables
Country

Citizen
Access
200
40

Citizen
Involvement
Religious Courts
Traditional Courts

Judge
Removal
None
Any Offense

Judge
Civil
Oversight
Law
Broad
No
Professional
No

Netherlands 15
Finland
10

3900
1927

None
As judges

None
Impeachment

None
Professional

Yes
Yes

Mexico
Poland

2712
2800

None
As judges

None
None

None
Broad

Yes
No

Nigeria
Cameroon

Press
Freedom
53
65

38
18

Press Freedom is the Freedom House Freedom of Press score.
Citizen Access measures citizen access to information operationalized as the number of internet
users truncated to the thousands.
Citizen Involvement indicates whether or not citizens are involved in the judicial process.
Judge Removal indicates whether or not judges of the country’s high court are subject to removal.
Judge Oversight indicates the types of judicial oversight in the countries.
Civil law indicates whether or not the country is a civil law country.
Comparative Results
Table 7 lists the values of the variables used to test the hypotheses above for each of the pairs of
countries. For each pair, the country listed first is less concerned about correcting corruption in the
judiciary than the country listed second. The table illustrates that none of the values is predictive. Both
citizen involvement (in any capacity) in the judicial process and the ability to remove judges is consistent
for all of the countries that are less concerned about judicial corruption. In Nigeria, which has separate
hierarchies for religious and public courts, citizens are involved only in religious courts. Similarly, in
Cameroon citizens are involved only at the traditional court level. The Netherlands, and Mexico have
little citizen involvement. Finland and Poland, both of which are more concerned about judicial
corruption than their partner country, involve citizens as judges. Nigeria, the Netherlands, and Mexico
have little ability to remove judges. Yet Poland, with more than double the perceived judicial corruption
of Mexico, also has little ability to remove judges. The two countries with the greatest ability to remove
judges are also the two countries with higher perceived judicial corruption. In two cases, the countries
with higher perceived judicial corruption, Finland and Poland, are considered to have a freer press than
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the countries with lower perceived judicial corruption. Cameroon follows the expected pattern since it
has higher perceived judicial corruption and its press is considered less free than Nigeria’s. The range of
difference in Freedom of the Press scores is also notable. Nigeria and Cameroon, and the Netherlands
and Finland have Freedom of the Press scores within 10 points of each other. Mexico and Poland, on the
other hand, have a 20-point difference between their scores. Consequently, there is no discernable pattern
between Freedom of the Press and perceived judicial corruption. In two cases the country with the lower
perceived corruption has greater access to information, Nigeria and the Netherlands. Here Poland is the
exception because it has more access to information than Mexico but also has a higher level of perceived
judicial corruption. However, the difference is very small, particularly when compared to the extreme
differences between the other pairs of countries. Judicial oversight varies considerably among the
countries. Nigeria (lower perceived judicial corruption than Cameroon) has more ability to exercise
judicial oversight than Cameroon, where judicial oversight is performed only by a professional
organization. Conversely, Poland and Finland (higher perceived judicial corruption) have the ability to
exercise judicial oversight while Mexico and the Netherlands have no judicial oversight. There is also no
pattern as to the type of law. Both Nigeria and Cameroon are mixed law countries, Nigeria having
common, customary, and religious law and Cameroon having civil, common, and customary law. Both
the Netherlands and Finland are civil law countries. However, Mexico and Poland do support the third
hypothesis since Mexico, with lower perceived judicial corruption, is a civil law country while Poland,
with higher perceived judicial corruption, is not.
This qualitative test of the hypotheses provides some insights into perceived judicial corruption.
Contrary to expectations, countries with lower perceived judicial corruption are more likely to have lower
levels of citizen involvement and less ability to remove judges. This directly contradicts accepted theory
as well as the second hypothesis that greater accountability will lead to lower perceived judicial
corruption. The variables also indicate that access to information can lead to lower perceived judicial
corruption. This finding offers support for the second hypothesis that greater transparency leads to
decreased perceived corruption. However, none of these variables achieved statistical significance in the
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model. This indicates that further research is needed to better understand the extent to which these
variables impact perceived judicial corruption. To further understand the impact of the legal system the
three sub-hypotheses will bet assessed.
The first sub-hypothesis, that an alternate judicial experience will decrease perceived judicial
corruption, can only be tested with the cases of Nigeria and Cameroon since Finland, the Netherlands,
Mexico, and Poland have not had alternate judicial experiences. Nigeria had an alternate judicial
experience that was not duplicated in Cameroon. The Human Rights Violations Investigation
Commission in Nigeria completed its work in 2002.36 This experience allowed Nigerians to see that
courts can bring justice to elites for serious human rights violations. Since Nigeria has lower perceived
judicial corruption it supports this hypothesis.
Nigeria and Cameroon also offer the only test of the second sub-hypothesis, that increased use of
military courts will lead to increased perceived judicial corruption, since military courts are not used for
civilian purposes in Finland, the Netherlands, Mexico, or Poland. The military is able to prosecute
civilians in Cameroon but not in Nigeria. Therefore, since perceived judicial corruption is higher in
Cameroon than Nigeria this hypothesis is also supported. Yet, a more detailed look at the court system
within each of these countries indicates that there are differences in the structures of the courts, which
may have the same result as a military court. Cameroon’s judicial system allows traditional chiefs to have
private courts, a feature that is not duplicated in Nigeria. Since the chief’s courts are private with private
methods of punishment and no documented case law, it is reasonable to expect that their impact on
perceived judicial corruption is similar to that of military courts.
The third sub-hypothesis, that a change in the judicial system within the last 20 years will result
in increased judicial corruption can be tested by Mexico and Poland since none of the other countries
have experienced significant changes in their judiciary in the last 20 years. Since emerging from
communist rule in the 1990s, Poland has experienced a change in both laws and the structure of the
judiciary. Since the changes are being introduced gradually37 Poland’s judiciary is not stable and is still
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contains Communist vestiges. Conversely, the judiciary in Mexico, which is perceived as less corrupt
than Poland’s, has remained stable, as the hypothesis expects.
Since none of these hypotheses explain the difference in perceived corruption between Finland
and the Netherlands, further analysis of the two judiciaries indicate two notable differences. The
Netherlands has a strictly hierarchical judicial structure, judges are appointed by the Monarchy and serve
for life, and judicial review is not allowed by the Constitution. Finland has a dual judicial system (one for
civil matters and one for criminal matters) and judges are appointed by the President and are tenured.
Finland’s Constitution does not take a stand on judicial review but does provide for a committee within
the Parliament to ensure the constitutionality of enacted laws. Consequently, there are two differences
between the countries. First, the Netherlands, with the lower perceived judicial corruption, does not allow
judicial review. Second, the structure of the two judicial systems differs with the system in the
Netherlands, where the judiciary is perceived as less corrupt, being more straightforward since it is
strictly hierarchical. These differences indicate that structural and procedural aspects of the judicial
system should be assessed in more detailed research.
In summary, the statistical findings, that the legal system influences perceived judicial corruption,
are supported by these qualitative findings. These case comparisons illustrate that structure of the court
system and the judicial process can differentiate levels of perceived judicial corruption. Notably the
measures of transparency and accountability produced mixed results, also supporting the unexpected
results of these measures in the statistical model. Therefore, rather than supporting the corruption
literature which states that transparency and accountability matter, these findings support findings by
Tyler (Tyler et al, 1991, 1989; Tyler, 2000, 1994) that experiences with the judicial system make a
difference in perceptions of judicial corruption.
These comparisons also indicate four research paths to a better understanding of the causes of
perceived judicial corruption. First, the relationship between perceived judicial corruption and citizen
involvement in the judicial process needs to be better understood. The original expectation was that
citizen involvement in the judicial process would increase transparency and, therefore, decrease perceived
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judicial corruption. However, comparison of the variables used to test the primary and sub-hypotheses
indicate this might not be the case. This is important because the results may influence the types of
judicial reforms implemented. Second, the findings in this section support the hypothesis that increased
transparency, operationalized as increased access to information, occurs in the countries with lower levels
of perceived judicial corruption despite the lack of support that this hypothesis received from the same
variable in the statistical model. Consequently, further research is needed to determine the exact
relationship between these two variables. Third, the relationship between the jurisdiction of military
courts and perceived judicial corruption requires more research. Although the military court variable is
only applicable in Cameroon, many countries transitioning to democracy, particularly in Latin America
and Africa, have vestiges of military rule. In addition, the existence of private courts for the traditional
chiefs in Cameroon indicates that the research needs to look beyond just military courts to include other
types of courts outside the state judicial system.

Finally, the information from Poland, Finland, and the

Netherlands indicates that the impact of the structure of the judicial system and judicial process on
perceived judicial corruption needs to be considered. This is important because these aspects of the
judiciary are outside non-transitional judicial reform efforts.

Conclusions
Several important findings emerge from this research. First, the relationship between perceptions
of judicial corruption and traditional remedies for corruption is not as robust as it is often portrayed. In
particular, factors that are used to hold judges accountable, such as citizen participation, removal of
judges, review of judges, and oversight, need closer study since these factors varied in their impact on
perceived judicial corruption. Conversely, access to information, a traditional remedy for transparency,
was associated with lower levels of perceived judicial corruption in the comparative cases. If judicial
reforms are aimed at addressing these transparency and accountability factors without understanding the
impact on perceived judicial corruption, the reforms may not resolve the consequences of perceived
judicial corruption. Second, the models indicate that countries with the civil law tradition may have more
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perceived judicial corruption than countries with common law traditions and countries with religious law
systems may have less perceived judicial corruption. Further research in this area is needed to determine
the exact impact of the legal tradition including the impact of legal systems that are mixed with religious
and common law. Third, the impact of alternate judicial experiences and non-national judicial systems,
such as military or tribal courts, on perceived judicial corruption requires further study. This is
particularly relevant for special commissions and tribunals since these efforts are aimed at rectifying past
wrong and improving confidence in the current system. Finally, the comparison of countries indicates
that judicial structure and process may influence perceptions of judicial corruption. If these factors
impact the way citizens perceive the judiciary yet they are not addressed during judicial reforms, the
ability of the reforms to build success in the judiciary may be compromised.
It is important to reiterate that this study sought to identify variables that potentially impact
aggregate perceived judicial corruption rather than exact explanations for individual perceptions of
corruption in an effort to focus future research. Identifying exact factors that determine whether or not
the citizens of a country perceive the judiciary to be corrupt requires direct feedback from the citizens.
Without the direct explanation from the citizens, an effort that would be quite substantial, studies can do
no more than point at possible causal factors.
This study was successful in providing additional insight into factors that influence citizens’
perception of judicial corruption, factors which have not been considered in prior research. Of particular
interest are the potential influences of culture and the judicial system. Current judicial reforms address
administrative and judicial education issues. They do not completely restructure the judicial process and
system, except where the countries are migrating from Soviet rule, and they do not address cultural
factors, such as respect for the law or military, traditional, religious, or private judicial systems. These
factors not only impact perceptions of the judicial system, they impact the values and norms that
influence the use, imposition, and acceptance of the judicial system. Therefore, if judicial reforms are to
increase the rule of law and combat corruption in all areas of the society, these factors need to be as much
of the reform process as the administrative and educational efforts.
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1

World Values Survey numbers combine people indicating either no confidence or not very much confidence in the
legal system. A total of 1,211 people responded to the survey. 636 of the respondents indicated “not very much
confidence” in the legal system and 329 indicated “no confidence” in the legal system.

2

Based on reporting from BBC at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3648895.stm.

3

Reported by Freedom House at http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm.

4

Mauro used measurements provided by Business International of the impact to business of both corruption and
Legal system efficiency and integrity. Although these measures are checked by Business International for accuracy
and efficiency they are based on assessments made by Business International analysts and correspondents based in
the country and are, therefore, subjective. However, Mauro feels that the price paid for the reports by businesses is
“evidence for the accuracy and relevance of the indices”. He further feels that these measures are an appropriate
proxy for investor assessment of the business environment of the country.

5

Reported by Freedom House at http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm.

6

The question posed was “If you had a magic wand and you could eliminate corruption from one of the following
institutions what would be your first choice?”

7

Statistics are from the Global Corruption Barometer 2003 that consisted of a household survey of 40,808 people
across 47 countries asking respondents which institution would be their first choice from which to eliminate
corruption.

8

Statistics are from the World Values Survey 1995-1997 which asked respondents to rank confidence in the legal
system as great deal, quite a bit, not very, none, or don’t know. “Don’t know” responses were not included in the
calculation of the percents to ensure that the figures accurately represented the respondents at the two margins.

9

Another possibility is, of course, that there is an error in the survey, thus producing biased and misleding results.
Care has been taken, however, to compare results from various sources including Transparency International, World
Bank, and World Values Survey. Concern with the judiciary is voiced across the sources lending credence each of
the individual sources. Refer to Table 5 discussed below.

11

The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is based on several different sources including business, expert, and
citizen views. The result is a calculated number specific to the country but which can be compared across countries.
The ranking is being used here since it is a scalar, meaningful number.
12

The Freedom of Press score does not provide a direct measure of press reporting of judicial decisions. However,
based on the assumption that a free press will freely and fairly access and report decisions, this will serve as an
adequate proxy measure. The Freedom of Press score is unique to each country and can be compared across
countries.
13

To verify that this was an appropriate conclusion a variable was constructed that indicated whether judicial
information (including case decisions) could be easily accessed via the internet. The Pearson correlation between
this variable and the Freedom House Freedom of the Press was .414 with a significance of .006 indicating that the
correlation was statistically significant at the p < .01 level.
14

This is a constructed dichotomous variable that indicates whether or not decisions can be easily accessed. Ease of
access was based on the ability to view decisions via the internet. This method was chosen because it would provide
greater access to decisions then having to access bound volumes of decisions in a library or other limited locations.
An argument could be made that use of decisions would be based on such factors as education, literacy, and
infrastructure. The assumption used here is that if the decision is available it can be monitored and reported at some
level and, therefore, will overcome any hindrances caused by the other factors. The variable was coded 0 if
decisions could not be accessed and 1 if access was available.
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15

This is a constructed variable. Three points are used to measure participation. If citizens do not participate in the
judicial process it is coded as zero (0). If citizens participate at some level, such as jurors, it is coded as one (1).
And if citizens participate as judges it is coded as two (2).
16

This is a constructed dichotomous variable. A zero (0) indicates that there is no judicial review while a one (1)
indicates that there is a review either through the judicial system (for example, by virtue of an appeals process) or by
an independent group or both. An argument could be made that there is a different level of transparency in appeals
versus independent or peer review. For the purposes of this study the level of detail provided by separating these
types of review is not needed.
17

This is a dichotomous variable that is coded zero (0) of judges are not subject to removal and one (1) if they are.
Information about removal was based on the country’s constitution and/or descriptions of the legal process by the
United States Department of State (http://www.state.gov) and legal information available on the Jurist website at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/worldlaw. The definition of removal used for this study was that judges could be removed
from the bench in the case of misconduct either through the process of impeachment or as a upon conviction of a
crime or misconduct. An argument could be made that increased flexibility in removing judges from the bench
would increase perceived and actual judicial corruption because it would decrease the independence of the judiciary
and, therefore, this variable should measure levels of removal. A counter argument is that independence of the
judiciary is undermined as much or more through appointments and personal pressure by the executive. Since the
purpose of this study is to determine whether or not there is a relationship the dichotomous values will be used with
the caveat that the extent of this relationship requires further study.
18

This is a dichotomous variable, which is coded as zero (0) if there is not an oversight group and one (1) if an
oversight group exists. For the purposes of this study an oversight group is defined as a body, either governmental
such as an Ombudsman or professional such as a Bar Association, that regulates and monitors judicial behavior.
Coding is based on information in the country’s constitution and/or descriptions of the legal process by the United
States Department of State (http://www.state.gov) and legal information available on the Jurist website at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/worldlaw.
19

Cultural diversity could be measured as either the number of ethnic groups or the number of recognized
languages. Languages is being used here because a difference in language causes a division within the society
whereas ethnic differences can be overcome by the use of a common language. The data is drawn from the U. S.
Department of State.
20

Mexico v. US opinion dated March 31, 2004.

21

This variable is operationalized as support for the national government reported in the World Values Survey.
Although this is not a direct measure of leader support the assumption is being made that the popularity of the leader
will be reflected in support for the national government.
22

Number of internet users is drawn from the World Bank and is truncated to the thousands (i.e. 10 rather than
10,000) to ensure a manageable number. Because the other statistics are lower values using the full number here
would skew results.
23

Three categories will be used: democratic, restricted democracy (including those regimes which are not fully
democratic and those which are constitutional monarchies), and authoritarian (including totalitarian, monarchies,
and military regimes). This is coded as: authoritarian = 0, restricted democracy = 1, and democracy = 2.
24

The Pearson correlation and significance between the variables and Real GDP per capita are: Education Pearson =
.639, significance = .000; internet usage Pearson = .411, significance = .006; and, regime type Pearson = .540,
significance = .000. Thus all of the variables are correlated to Real GDP per capita at the p < .01 level.
25

The Pearson correlation is -.751 (the negative relationship is due to the coding of the Freedom House Freedom of
the Press scores) at a significance of .000 which is statistically significant at the p < .001 level.
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26

Countries were ranked high if they were above the median point in the scale. Therefore a country would be
ranked high on overall corruption if they scored above the median CPI score and low on judicial corruption if the
scored below the median Global Corruption Barometer court measure.
27

Based on United States State Department information at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/.

28

Reported by the European Union at http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/index_en.htm#

29

Reported by OECD at http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html

30

Reported by Freedom House at http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm

31

Reported by OECD at http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html

32

Reported by Freedom House at http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm.

33

Reported by the United States State Department at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/pl.html#Govt
34

Reported by Freedom House at http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/nitransit/2003/index.htm

35

Reported by Freedom House at http://www.freedomhouse.org/reports/century.html

36

Reported by Freedom House at http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm.

37

Based on United States State Department information at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/pl.html#Govt
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